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The long awaited decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Eisner v. Macomber (1920) 40 Sup. Ct. 189,1 has aroused perhaps
more interest than is merited by the actual decision, which is simply
that dividends of a corporation declared by issuing its own stock
are not income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.
The flurry in the stock market caused by the erroneous report of
the decision, 2 the way in which the Court divided,8 and the criticism
of the decision in Congress and elsewhere, coupled with the view
that the Government must necessarily lose much revenue, have added
to the general interest elicited by the case.
While the decision does suggest interesting questions for the
future, it was scarcely unexpected. Before the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment the Court had held that as between life-
tenant and remainderman stock dividends were not income but capital
going to the remainderman.4 And under the 1913 income tax act
the Court in Towne v. Eisner,5 in holding that the act did not con-
template the taxing of stock dividends, had stated that such a dividend
'For complete statement of facts, see infra, CURENT DEcisiONs. The case
was argued in April, 1919, reargument was called for in May x91g, and the
case was reargued in October, igig. There is now pending in Congress
H. R. 13074, imposing an excise tax upon corporations of fifteen per cent. of
the face value of shares of stock issued as a stock dividend.
'See (192o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL,. 678.
Dissenting opinions were filed by Justice Holmes (Justice Day concurring)
and Justice Brandeis (Justice Clarke concurring). It seems almost settled
practice for the Supreme Court to hold acts unconstitutional by only a majority
of one.
"Gibbons v. Mahon (189o) 136 U. S. 549, 10 Sup. Ct. 1057. This is the
so-called Massachusetts rule. Minot v. Paine (1868) 99 Mass. ioi; Smith v.
Dana (19o5) 77 Conn. 543, 6o Atl. II7. Under the somewhat similar English
rule regular or ordinary dividends go to the life tenant while extraordinary
dividends go to the remainderman. Brander v. Brander (1799, Eng. Ch.)
4 Ves. 8oo; cf. Bouch v. Sproule (1887) L. P. 12 App. Cas. 385. Under the
Pennsylvania rule a stock dividend is apportioned between the life tenant and
remainderman according to the time of accumulation of the-fund from which
the dividend is declared with reference to the time of the creation of the
trust. Earp's Appeal (1857) 28 Pa. 368; Matter of Osborne (1913) 209 N. Y.
450, 1O3 N. E. 723. See (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 551; (919) 18 MICH. L. Rv.
69. That a stock dividend, unlike a cash dividend, may be revoked after its
declaration, see_(I917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 598.
' (ii8) 245 U. S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct. 158. See COMMENT (1918) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 553.
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was properly capital.' The present case arose under the 1916 act,
which, like the later income tax acts, expressly attempted to treat such
dividends as income. 7  Justice Pitney, speaking for the majority,
reiterates the previous view of the Court that such dividends are in
effect only a book adjustment of the corporation, being a transfer
of surplus to capital stock, and that the proportionate interest of
the stockholder has in no manner been changed by the declaration of
the diridend.8  Especially telling is his argument that by such declara-
tion the taxpayer receives no income from which to pay an income
tax and, if without other assets, must sell some of his shares to make
payment. By such sale his proportionate interest in the corporate
assets would be lessened and his capital impaired. Therefore the
Court considered that the act was unconstitutional under the Six-
teenth Amendment which gives Congress the power to lay and collect
taxes on "incomes from whatever source derived" without the appor-
tionment according to population required of direct taxes under the
original provisions of the Constitution."
As Justice Holmes wrote the opinion in Towne v. Eisner, his dis-
senting opinion, concurred in by Justice Day, is of especial interest.
He adheres to his view that on sound principles a stock dividend is
not income, but believes that the term "income" in -the Amendment
is broad enough to include stock dividends, since the purpose of the
Amendment "was to get rid of nice questions as to what might be
direct taxes" and that most people not lawyers would suppose that
in voting for the Amendment they had put questions like the present
to rest. And he refers to the Massachusetts ruling where such a
'In Peabody v. Eisner (1918) 247 U. S. 347, 38 Sup. Ct. 546, dividends paid
in the stock of another corporation were held taxable. Dividends payable out
of surplus acquired before the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment may be
taxed if declared thereafter. Lynch v. Hornby (1918) 247 U. S. 339, 38 Sup.
Ct. 543. But not where the later transaction is mere bookkeeping rather than
the declaration and payment of dividends in ordinary course. Southern Pacific
Co. v. Lowe (I918) 247 U. S. 330, 38 Sup. Ct. 54o; Gulf Oil Corporation v.
Lewellyn (1918) 248 U. S. 71, 39 Sup. Ct. 35; see also note 22, infra.
"Rev. Act. of Sept. 8, 1916, ch. 463, sec. 2 a, 39 Stat. L. 756, 757; ibid.,
Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63, sec. 1211, 40 Stat. L.; ibid., Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, sec.
2Ol a, c, d, 40 Stat. L. io59 (Act of 1918).
'Compare authorities cited in note 4, supra. There is only "a mere shuffling
of titles." Davenport (1918) 4 BULLETIN NATIONAL TAX Ass'N, 53. See
discussion of Professor F."R. Fairchild and Mr. Bond in (1918) 3 ibid., 161-163,
37-243, also complete discussion by Professor Seligman, Are Stock Dividends
Income? (1919) 9 Am. ECON. REv. 517. In Montgomery, Income Tax Pro-
cedure (1918) 188, a comparison is suggested of the change of a five dollar bill
into five one dollar bills.
"The two constitutional restrictions on the power of Congress to levy direct
taxes are found in Art. I, sec. 2, par. 3, modified by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and Art. x, sec. 9, par. 5, of the federal Constitution.
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view was taken of a state income tax amendment.10 The view of
"most people," however, must necessarily be a controversial matter
and inasmuch as reason and the decision of the Court previous to the
Amendment are contrary to this suggested view, it is quiite as
justifiable to believe that most people felt otherwise. And unfor-
tunately the Amendment did not take the desirable course of settling
all questions as to direct taxes by removing all direct tax restrictions
from the Constitution, but definitely left such requirements effective
except as to direct taxes on incomes."'
Justice Holmes' view does, however, point the way to dangers that
may arise from a too narrow construction of the Amendment.
Economists are not agreed as to the meaning of the term "income"' 2
and surely the Supreme Court cannot expect to decide for itself each
minor provision of an income tax as to inclusion or deduction in com-
puting taxable income. Its bias in construing a statute is to construe it
strictly, but in construing a constitutional provision its bias must be
to favor the judgment of the law-making body as far as possible, i. e.,
to uphold the constitutionality of the statute.ls Hence while the
decision in Eisner v. Macomber seems quite simply correct, if it is
to be pressed to the extent of unduly hampering Congress its results
will be unfortunate.
Justice Brandeis' position, concurred in by Justice Clarke, is essen-
tially the same as that of Justice Holmes, though he makes a more
elaborate argument that stock dividends may properly be considered
income. His most striking point is that in corporate financing there
is no real difference between a stock dividend and a cash dividend
coupled with the privilege of subscribing to an additional issue of
stock, the subscription to be paid by the cash dividend. Either seems
to be considered by financiers as a stock dividend. In the latter case
the dividend is admittedly taxable. But the difference, nevertheless,
is real. It is the difference between realized and unrealized invest-
ment or capital gains. The fact that the choice of methods is with
" Tax Com'r vu. Putnam (1917) 227 Mass. 522, II6 N. E. 904, L. R. A.
1917 F 8o6, construing the 44th amendment to the constitution of Massachu-
setts. See also Wilder v. Trefry, Com'r (i92O, Mass.) 125 N. E. 689, holding
that accrued cumulative dividends on preferred stock are taxable as income.
In Great Britain, where there is no constitutional restriction, stock dividends
have been held taxable under an act of West Australia. Swan Brewery Co.,
Ltd. v. The King [1914] A. C. 231.
U Cf. (March 20, 1920) 2 THE REV Ew, 271. An amendment removing all con-
stitutional restrictions as to direct taxes has been vigorously urged. Selig-
man, The Income Tax (2d ed. 1914) 594; Whitney, The Income Tax and the
ConStitutio n (1907) 20 HARv. L. REv. 280, 296.
'2 See, e. g., the laws of different countries collected in Seligman, op. cit.,
as well as the views of economists cited throughout this article.
"Authorities cited by Justice Brandeis, dissenting; see also Tax Coin'r v.
Putnam, supra; (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 553, 555.
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the corporation does not change this situation. One may own real
estate under conditions where there is little doubt that its value has
appreciated and yet that appreciation is too indefinite to be considered
income or even "profits" until it is definitely ascertained as it may
be when the owner decides to and does sell. This seems to be the
real differenice between the case put by Justice Brandeis and the situa-
tion presented in Eisner v. Macomber. In one the measuring stick
for appreciation, i. e., realization, has been applied, in the other it
has not. And if, as hereinafter discussed realized capital gains are
taxable, the fears of Justice Brandeis and of Congressmen as to the
great loss of revenue to the government are largely groundless.Y
Now it would seem clear that mere general appreciation in value
of capital should not be deemed income so long as it is unrealized
to the owner,15 and this is the distinction attempted to be made by the
government under the present income tax law which purports to tax
profits from the sale of capital items.18 It may not always be a simple
matter to decide just what constitutes a realization of income; but
the goal is fairly clear. Is such realized gain fairly to be considered
as income within the meaning of the Amendment? It is submitted
that the answer should be in the affirmative17 and this is clearly the
" The result in the main is simply to defer the time when the stock may
be taxed. A change in the rate of tax from year to year may of course make
a difference in receipts from the tax, and so may the practice referred to
hereinafter of taking investment losses and reinvesting in tax exempt securities.
On the other hand the government may gain under the existing system of
graduated taxes. Thus under the present law, note 7, supra, the stock dividend
was to have been valued to the amount of the earnings or profits distributed
i. e., usually at par. U. S. INT. REv. REGULATIONS 45 (1gig) art. 1545. Suppose
a stock dividend is. declared this year and sold at twice its. par value next year.
If the stock dividend was taxed as income this year and the increase in value
realized on iale was taxed next year, the total tax is spread over two years.
If only the profit from the sale is taxable, the entire value will be taxed next
year and thus possibly bring up the tax payer's total income, so that a higher
surtax rate applies. Cf. note 3o, infra.
' Seligman, Are Stock Dividends Income? op. cit., 517, 536: "The real dis-
tinction to be kept continually, in mind in threading one's way through the
mazes of the income'tax is between the actual receipt of income on the one
hand and the unrealized appreciation of capital on the other." Quoted with
approval in Montgomery, Income Tax Procedure (192o) 483. See also Selig-
man, ibid., 530. "Separation and realization are of the essence of the trans-
mutation of capital into income."
"Act, Feb. 24, 1919, sees. 202 a, 213 a; Art. 1563 of REGULATIONS 45 sUpra.
(Cf. Treasury Decision 2971, Feb. 4, 1920) "Both a change in substance and
not merely in form, and a change into the equivalent of cash are required to
complete or close a transaction from which income must be realized." Mont-
gomery, op. cit., 334.
'. See discussion in Seligman, op. cit., supra, 517 ff., of 9 AM. EcoN, . REv.;
Lutz, The Progress of State Income Taxation since 1911 (1920) IO ibid., 66, 77;
Montgomery, Income Tax Procedure (1920) 335 ff., ibid. (1918) 77ff. In
England such gains have not been taxed except where the sales constituted
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view of Justice Pitney in the principal case."" The point, however,
is unfortunately not beyond dispute. The argument to the contrary is
that as unrealized capital gains are capital so the sale of capital even
though at a profit is only a change of form of capital. In Gray v.
Darlington,"0 which held that the act of 1867 did not tax gains on sales
of bonds held for four years, it was stated that such gains are capital
and not income. In cases under the corporation tax act of 19o9 it was
held that the profits from sales might be included in computing the tax,20
but it has also been held that this is an excise or franchise and not an
income tax and hence nice questions as to income were avoided.21
The language of Gray v. Darlington, seems to have been more or less
approved in one case under the 1913 act.2 2  On principle is it not
fairer to consider even appreciation of the value of capital as more
nearly income, though too indefinite to be computed, than capital?
Income which is not consumed by the owner becomes capital and
capital can really be increased only by the addition of income. Such
income added to capital may properly be taxed as income once either
before or after it is added to capital. This is simply levying the tax
a part of the seller's business as a trader. Tebrau Rubber Syndicate (iDio)
Scot. Cas. 9o6, 47 Scot. L. Rep. 816; Montgomery, op. cit.; though the situa-
tion is partly changed by a land increment value tax. Finance Act, i9io; io
Edw. VII, ch. 8, pt. x. In Wisconsin, a statute taxing such gains has been
held unconstitutional. State ex rel. Bundy v. Nygaard (1916) 163 Wis. 307,
i58 N. W. 87, L. R. A. 1917 E 563, note. Tax Com'r v. Putnam, supra, is contra.
See also Park's Estate (i896) I73 Pa. 190, 33 Atl. 884; Miller v. Douglass
(1875) 42 Tex. 288. In England-a royal commission has urged further taxation
of capital gains. THE MANCHESTER GUARDIAN (weekly ed.) April 2, 1920.
" "Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor,
or from both combined; provided it be understood to include profit gained
through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in th
Doyle case" (see note 20, infra). "It is said that a stockholder may sell the
new shares acquired in the stock dividend; and so he may, if he can find a
buyer. It is equally true that if he does sell, and in doing so realizes a profit,
such profit, like any other, is income, and so far as it may have arisen since
the Sixteenth Amendment is taxable by Congress without apportionment."
40 Sup. Ct. 193, 195.
"(1872, U. S.) i5 Wall. 63. Here all that was necessary for a decision was
the construction of the act, and any discussion as to the nature of capital gains
was unnecessary.
"Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co. (1918) 247 U. S. 179, 38 Sup. Ct. 467; Hays
v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co. (I918) 247 U. S. 189, 38 Sup. Ct. 470, which tieats
Gray v. Darlington as a case merely of construction.
"Stratton's Independence v. Howbert (1913) 231 U. S. 399, 34 Sup. Ct. 136;
Anderson v. Forty-Two Broadway Co. (i915) 239 U. S. 69, 36 Sup. Ct. i7.
'Lynch v. Turrish (1gi8) 247 U. S. 221, 230, 38 Sup. Ct. 537, which held
merely that enhancement in value prior to the passage of the Amendment was
not taxable, but which stated that Gray v. Darlington held an advance in
value not to be income at all but merely increase of capital. See Lynch v.
Turrish (1916, C. C. A. 8th) 236 Fed. 653, 66o; Towne v. Eisner (1917,
S. D. N. Y.) 242 Fed. 702, 707; Holmes, Federal Taxes (i90o) 631-637.
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after the addition is made. The other argument proves too much,
since if additions to capital by way of profits from sales are not
income, no more should any additions to capital from current receipts
be considered income.23  However this may be there is at most a
division of opinion such that the judgment of Congress in this case
should be considered not unreasonable.
The taxation of capital gains requires in justice an allowance for
capital losses, and this is provided for in the 1918 act.2 ' The result
may operate to the detriment of the government since an incentive
is given to the taxpayer to realize his losses while postponing the
realization of gains. This might be viewed with equanimity in view
of the expectation that actual capital gains will be realized and taxed
ultimately,25 were it not for the presence of a large amount of tax
exempt bonds, municipal, state and federal. The large investor will
naturally put his money from investments sold at a loss into tax
exempt securities, and hence there is a loss of this source of revenue
to the Government for the future, accompanied by a present deduc-
tion from income for the year in which the change is made. Perhaps
the most serious defect of our present system of income taxation is
the existence of these securities, diverting capital from business needs
and putting a premium on governmental extravagance. It would seem
vitally necessary to find a way whereby all income is subject to the
tax.2 6
Seligman, op. cit., 525 of 9 Am. EcoN. REv.: "Capital is capitalized income."
24Act, Feb. 24, 1919, sec. 214 a, 4, 5, 6. Such losses must be, in general,
business losses and losses from transactions entered into for profit, as dis-
tinguished from losses in the nature of personal expenses. Montgomery,
op. cit. (1920) 648-651; Holmes, op. cit., 372.,A question may arise whether under a progressive rate of taxation, such
gains when realized should all be taxed within the year of realization, as in
the 1918 income tax act, or should be apportioned over a series of years'.
It has been urged that the time from which such gains are computed (now
March I, 1913, or approximately the date of adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment) should be advanced from time to time. Lutz, op. cit.
"*The unfortunate results of present conditions are graphically described
by Kahn, Two Years of Faulty Taxation and the Results (1920) 11-12. They
were accurately prophesied by Seligman, The Income Tax, supra, 615. It will
be recalled that Governor Hughes asked the New York legislature to reject
the Sixteenth Amendment on the ground that it permitted Congress to tax
state and municipal bonds and thus vitally hamper state governments. It
would seem that unfortunately Governor Hughes was probably wrong in his
interpretation of the Amendment. See authorities collected in Ballantine, Some
Constitutional Aspects of the Excess Profits Tax (1920) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 625, 629, 630, citing cases showing that such taxation was illegal
before the Amendment, and that the Amendment did not grant any new power
of taxation to Congress but simply removed a disability in taxing a certain
kind of property. See also Eisner v. Macomber, supra. The economic argu-
ments showing that such taxation would not hamper the governmental agencies
of a state are set forth in Seligman, op. cit., 6oo-614. Possibly these argu-
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Other problems of an administrative nature will arise from an
attempt to tax capital gains. Nevertheless these are not insurmount-
able and do not override the argument that failure to tax gains so
made is unfair and unjust to those who are paying taxes on other
forms of gain, such as salaries.2 7  Possibly as difficult a problem as
any that may arise is how to tax such gains as between life-beneficiary
and remainderman of a trust. Gains and losses upon conversion of
capital units are held to affect the corpus of the estate, i. e., the
interest of the -remainderman, and only incidentally the interest of
the life-tenant as the future yield from the corpus is thereby varied.28
Should the life-tenant in computing his taxable income deduct the
losses or add the gains from changes in capital? It may seem
anomalous at first, but it would appear that this is a case of unrealized
loss or gain and should not affect the life-tenant's income.29
So another question of some interest may arise in connection with
capital given away. Suppose A owns stock which doubles in
value. He gives it to B who sells at the increased value. Under
present regulations the increase in value is not taxed.30
There is one other important constitutional point connected with
Eisner v. Macombey, namely, may the "veil of the corporate entity"
be pierced for the purposes of income taxation? The government in
that case contended that the tax upon stock dividends might be con-
ments, coupled with the increasing tendency of the Court, following Veazie
Bank v. Fenno (i87o, U. S.) 8 Wall. 533, to uphold broadly grants of power
to the federal government, even at the expense of the states, may lead to a
different result. See South Carolina v. United States (195o) 199 U. S. 437,
26 Sup. Ct. ii, upholding a federal tax upon a state dispensary; First National
Bank v. Union Trust Co. (1917) 244 U. S. 416, 37 Sup. Ct. 734, holding that,
Congress having granted national banks in competition with state trust com-
panies the power of acting as fiduciaries, such banks cannot be excluded from
so acting by state legislattires; Seligman, op. cit., 615-621. Compare also
Murdock v. Ward (1goo) 178 U. S. 139, 20 Sup. Ct. 775; Whitney, op. cit.,
286. The recent proposal of the Secretary of the Treasury quoted by Kahn,
op. cit., 3, that the surtax rates upon taxable incomes be increased in propor-
tion to the amount of income received by the taxpayer from tax-exempt
securities, would, even if it is legal, be only partially helpful. Cf. note 41, infra.
' See Lutz, op. cit., 77 of IO AM. EcoN. Rv.; Montgomery, op. cit. (192o)
334-341; Seligman, 9 Am. ECoN. REV. 516; cf. Seligman, The Income Tax
(2d ed. 1914) 68i.
'Boardman v. Mansfield (i9o7) 79 Conn. 634, 66 Atl. 169; Jordan v. Jordan
(igo6) 192 Mass. 337, 78 N. E. 459; Matter of Gerry (1886) 103 N. Y. 445,
9 N. E. 235; Neel's Estate (19o4) 207 Pa. 446, 56 AtL. 95o.
' This is the government's position. Treasury Decisions 2987, March I,
1920, adding Art. 347 to REGULATIONS 45. If this is correct; the further position
of the government that capital gains should be-taxed to the fiduciary before
being realized by the remainderman (ibid.) would seem questionable.
Act, Feb. 24, 1919, sec. 202; REGULATIONS 45, Art. 1562 ff. Should not such
gain be held income to the donor? So there is no income on transmission of
property by descent or devise. REGULATIONS 45, Art. 343. Here inheritance
taxes fill the gap to some extent.
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sidered as a tax upon the stockholder's share of the undivided profits
held by the corporation. justice Pitney stated that if the act were
so construed it would be unconstitutional since undeclared dividends
could not be considered income, and that a case deciding otherwise
under the act of 1864 must be considered overruled. 1 It would seem
that the appropriate answer to the government's contention was that
made by Justice Brandeis, dissenting, namely, that the act before the
court (act of 1916) would not bear such a construction. But Justice
Pitney seems to assume that to hold a stock dividend to be capital
is to foreclose the possibility of any income tax upon a stockholder's
undivided interest in a corporation. It is submitted that such is not
the case. An attempt to tax stock dividends as income when declared
involves an .admission of the existence of the corporate personality
and a claimed detachment of property from that personality brought
about by the simple declaration of the dividend. The situation is
otherwise when the legislative body elects to adopt an entirely different
theory of taxation and disregard entirely the corporate personality,-
a child of it or some other legislative body. Why may it not do so?
We are prone to forget what Professor Hohfeld so graphically
portrayed,8 2 that a corporation is nothing more than one way in which
individuals may carry on a business. Income in final analysis must
be the amount of wealth flowing in during a given period "which
is at the disposal of the owner for the purposes of consumption, so
that in consuming it, his capital remains unimpaired. 13 3 That is, it
must be at the disposal of some one-who may consume it if he chooses,
though actually he may not consume it but add it to his capital. This
means that it must finally be at the disposal of some individual, since
a corporation cannot consume wealth except as individuals are using
the corporate form to produce further wealth. Surely the corporate
frankenstein created by the individual is at bottom an aid to producing
wealth, not a wealth-consumer, or it will not be employed. Hence to
tax income in the hands of the corporation and again in the hands
of the stockholder is double taxation.8 ' Congress has made an attempt
to avoid this by exempting cash dividends from the normal income
tax but subjecting- such dividends to the surtaxes which are not
Collector v. Hubbard (i87o, U. S.) 12 Wall. i; holding that under the act
of 1864 undivided profits of a corporation are taxable. Justice Pitney states
that this case is overruled by Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (1895)
158 U. S. 6oi, 627, 628, 637, 15 Sup. Ct. 766. But this seems to be true only
to the extent that all previous income tax cases may be considered overruled
by the Pollock case, which decided not of what income consisted but that an
income tax was a direct tax. Collector v. Hubbard is discussed from the
economic standpoint by Seligman, ! Am. EcoN. REv. 532, 533, supra.
' Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for Corporation Debts
(1909) 9 COL. L. REv. 285; cf. (1920) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 659.
Seligman, The Income Tax (2d ed. 1914) i9; 9 Am. EcoN. REv. 523.
" Cf. (1918) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 682.
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levied upon corporations. Such attempt has now been largely aban-
doned since the excess profits tax is in effect a surtax levied upon
corporations. Much of the current criticism of that tax is undoubtedly
occasioned not so much by the tax itself, though it is unduly cumber-
some in practice, as by the double taxation which it occasions.35 In
addition, corporations must pay federal and state franchise or excise
taxes, and possibly, as in Connecticut, a state income tax from which
individuals are exempt. Or its stockholders may also be subject to
state income taxes. The contrast between "industrious incomes"
invested in corporations and "lazy incomes" invested in tax exempt
bonds is striking and lends added force to the agitation for taxing
"lazy incomes" at a higher rate as in England.8  Agitation for
remedying the present system of income taxation has presupposed a
fairer adjustment of individual and corporation taxes to avoid double
taxation."7 An interesting experiment in the way of avoiding double
taxation has been the attempt in the 1918 act to assimilate personal
service corporations-corporations whose gains depend upon the per-
sonal activities of its stockholders and not to any great extent upon
invested capital-to partnerships by exempting such corporations
from the corporation income tax and taxing the stockholders upon
the income of the corporation. s There has been so much adminis-
trative difficulty in working out normal and sur or graduated taxes
between corporations and stockholders that this plan of disregarding
the corporate entity entirely has seemed worthy of a fair trial. It
may be that it would be the most feasible scheme for the taxation of
all corporate incomes. Corporations might be required to file, as
information at the source, returns showing their profits while the tax
is levied only against the individual stockholders. Now it is obvious
that unless we go too far in the other direction and unduly favor the
corporate form of doing business undistributed profits must also be
taxed. An individual is taxed both upon the income he consumes
and upon the income he adds to capital, and hence the corporate income
which is added to capital should also be taxed. Hence the experiment
'Haig, British Experience with Excess Profits Taxation (i92o) io Ams.EcoN. REV. Sup. I, p. I, pointing out that Great Britain is to retain the excess
profits tax.'Montgomery, op. cit. (192o) I7, I8 (i9i8) 18; Seligman, The Income Tax
(2d ed. 1914) 199-200, 203, 2o4, 670, 702. Such distinction is made in theMassachusetts income tax (St. x916, ch. 269) and has been advocated byHerbert Hoover in the SATURDAY EVENING POST for April io, I920.'Dr. T. S. Adams, Immediate Future of the Excess Profits Tax (I92O) IOAm. EcoN. REV. Supp. I, p. 15; cf. Seligman, The Next Step in Tax Reform
(O915) i9. Seligman there admits the ameliorating results from the tendencyof the price of corporate securities to reflect such double taxation.Act, Feb. 24, i919, sec. 2oo, 218 a. So by sec. 220 the profits of any corpora-
tion availed of for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax uponits stockholders by accumulating profits, are taxed to the stockholders.
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can only be successful if all accumulated profits are taxed and this
in turn requires that the corporate personality be disregarded. It is
familiar law that the corporate personality may be disregarded under
various circumstances,3 9 and on the other hand that partnerships are
considered as entities for certain purposes, as under the bankruptcy
act.40  It is, therefore, not a serious matter from a legal standpoint
to disregard the personality created by law and hence it is regrettable
that Justice Pitney has cast doubt upon this point, all the more as it
was not necessary to his decision. His view leads to the question
whether the creature of the legislature is more powerful than the
legislature itself.
This does not mean that the legislature should be permitted at the
same time to treat the corporation as a separate personality and also
as a collection of individuals in order to increase tax-able income. It
may properly be required to take as to a particular corporation either
one theory of taxation or the other. The dividing line between capital
and income is elusive at best and the theory of the corporate entity
should not be juggled to cover double taxation, even though such
double taxation is permissible in itself.
Hence the decision in Eisner v. Macomber seems correct, but there
are many important problems which it suggests but does not settle.
It is most important that the taxability of realized capital gains as
income be settled, and while there are administrative difficulties, the
fairer plan seems to be that they should be taxed as income. It would
seem also that the Sixteenth Amendment is broad enough to permit
such taxation, and also that on general principles Congress as a legis-
lative body may disregard the corporate entity for income taxing
purposes. Nevertheless so long as there are available so many tax-
exempt securities, the income tax cannot be expected to operate with
a high degree of fairness.
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